By Russell Leigh Moses
An editorial this week in the Chinese Communist Party’s main propaganda mouthpiece may offer a hint of the types of changes Xi Jinping and his comrades are likely to put on the table at a key Party meeting next month.
An editorial this week in the Chinese Communist Party’s main propaganda mouthpiece may offer a hint of the types of changes Xi Jinping and his comrades are likely to put on the table at a key Party meeting next month.
Getty Images China’s President Xi Jinping, center, and Premier Li Keqiang, left, wave to delegates as they arrive for the opening ceremony of the 11th National Women’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People on Monday.
But those proposals could face tough resistance by entrenched Party interests with deep personal and political stakes in opposing reform.
The editorial in the People’s Daily newspaper, dated Tuesday, eschews the more cheerleading note the paper has struck recently in the run-up to the Third Plenum, the gathering that begins Nov. 9 and intended to set the Party’s agenda for the next decade. Instead, it argues that “profound reform” involves changing the Party’s role and how it operates.
First, there’s the “need to further rationalize the relationship between government and the market,” as the editorial says. One way forward, the editorial notes, is to consider the question of “how private capital might more equitably participate in market competition.”
Simply put, that means getting party cadres to stop dominating decisions about who gets what, and who gets it where–a nod to the push by some to let market forces play a greater role in the Chinese economy.
That could cheer reform-minded economists, but there’s a political angle to the point that underscores how difficult such moves might be. Mr. Xi and his allies are arguing that it’s high-time to stop Party officials from making every move–and much of the profit—where the economy is concerned.
For reformers, that’s the sort of ridiculous rent-seeking that renders economic decisions less rational, and adds to the public perception of Party extravagance.
But for cadres dependent on this largesse, this proposal means a shift in the way they dispense favors and thereby curry political support.
The second goal, the editorial notes, is to “improve the cadre selection system”–that is, assessing what sorts of officials are truly suited to deal with the complex social challenges China faces from urbanization, migration, and economic development.
Some of that strategy involves the fight against corruption, of course. But as the case of the recently deposed mayor of Nanjing shows, it’s also about making sure that cadres match up far better with public expectations than they have thus far. For another glimpse of that push, officials have been told to take a look at Guanxi province, where cadres are urged to be more available and accountable to the public and encouraged to leave official meetings and go out and meet people on the street to hear their voices.
That reaching out, the editorial is telling cadres, will produce “the right atmosphere that’s needed for society to conduct itself appropriately”—code words for Mr. Xi and his comrades’ ongoing strategy to move away from the previous leadership’s focus on “stability maintenance” and give residents better reasons for supporting reform initiatives.
Still, the fact that Party media is singling out successful cases in particular provinces means that there are many officials who have yet to change their conduct—and that no groundswell of approval from the masses is yet evident.
So, while reformers in the Party embrace these proposals, they must also recognize that there are hazards ahead.
One danger is that these are all ideas that have been raised before, but never part of one single, reform package. It’s one thing to experiment and put these shifts into place piecemeal—as Mr. Xi and his reform-minded allies have done since they assumed office. But it’s another to attempt to make these turns away from the past into something transformative for the Party and politics as a whole.
Some cadres may not buy into the whole package. More than a few officials already see these changes as aiming at a sort of self-sacrifice on their part that they see little reason to participate in.
There are other sources of hostility to these proposals. Party conservatives want far less change, and activists stuck outside the process clearly desire far more. Neither is satisfied by what they’re seeing from Mr. Xi so far.
So how can Mr. Xi compel those resisting to give way, and those who are actively in opposition to change their views?
According to the editorial, the answer is getting society to pressure cadres into changing.
Reforming the way the Communist Party works will, according to the commentary, “rally public consensus and provide the positive energy of a general mobilization” to support Mr. Xi and this package.
Once the public sees that the Xi leadership has the “courage to break through the obstruction of [outmoded] ideas, and also the courage to breach the defenses of vested interests,” the commentary predicts, “social vitality” will result, and reformers will be vindicated.
But Xi and his allies also know the clock is running: The editorial—coming on the same day as the dates for the Plenum are announced–is also clearly an appeal to cadres who support reform to give one last strong push in the closing days.
The Plenum might not be the last opportunity for the formal approval of political changes thus far. But it does offer the best prospect thus far for Mr. Xi and his allies to make their case that their sort of reform is the one cadres should believe in.
Russell Leigh Moses is the Dean of Academics and Faculty at The Beijing Center for Chinese Studies. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/10/30/editorial-hints-at-xis-challenge/
But those proposals could face tough resistance by entrenched Party interests with deep personal and political stakes in opposing reform.
The editorial in the People’s Daily newspaper, dated Tuesday, eschews the more cheerleading note the paper has struck recently in the run-up to the Third Plenum, the gathering that begins Nov. 9 and intended to set the Party’s agenda for the next decade. Instead, it argues that “profound reform” involves changing the Party’s role and how it operates.
First, there’s the “need to further rationalize the relationship between government and the market,” as the editorial says. One way forward, the editorial notes, is to consider the question of “how private capital might more equitably participate in market competition.”
Simply put, that means getting party cadres to stop dominating decisions about who gets what, and who gets it where–a nod to the push by some to let market forces play a greater role in the Chinese economy.
That could cheer reform-minded economists, but there’s a political angle to the point that underscores how difficult such moves might be. Mr. Xi and his allies are arguing that it’s high-time to stop Party officials from making every move–and much of the profit—where the economy is concerned.
For reformers, that’s the sort of ridiculous rent-seeking that renders economic decisions less rational, and adds to the public perception of Party extravagance.
But for cadres dependent on this largesse, this proposal means a shift in the way they dispense favors and thereby curry political support.
The second goal, the editorial notes, is to “improve the cadre selection system”–that is, assessing what sorts of officials are truly suited to deal with the complex social challenges China faces from urbanization, migration, and economic development.
Some of that strategy involves the fight against corruption, of course. But as the case of the recently deposed mayor of Nanjing shows, it’s also about making sure that cadres match up far better with public expectations than they have thus far. For another glimpse of that push, officials have been told to take a look at Guanxi province, where cadres are urged to be more available and accountable to the public and encouraged to leave official meetings and go out and meet people on the street to hear their voices.
That reaching out, the editorial is telling cadres, will produce “the right atmosphere that’s needed for society to conduct itself appropriately”—code words for Mr. Xi and his comrades’ ongoing strategy to move away from the previous leadership’s focus on “stability maintenance” and give residents better reasons for supporting reform initiatives.
Still, the fact that Party media is singling out successful cases in particular provinces means that there are many officials who have yet to change their conduct—and that no groundswell of approval from the masses is yet evident.
So, while reformers in the Party embrace these proposals, they must also recognize that there are hazards ahead.
One danger is that these are all ideas that have been raised before, but never part of one single, reform package. It’s one thing to experiment and put these shifts into place piecemeal—as Mr. Xi and his reform-minded allies have done since they assumed office. But it’s another to attempt to make these turns away from the past into something transformative for the Party and politics as a whole.
Some cadres may not buy into the whole package. More than a few officials already see these changes as aiming at a sort of self-sacrifice on their part that they see little reason to participate in.
There are other sources of hostility to these proposals. Party conservatives want far less change, and activists stuck outside the process clearly desire far more. Neither is satisfied by what they’re seeing from Mr. Xi so far.
So how can Mr. Xi compel those resisting to give way, and those who are actively in opposition to change their views?
According to the editorial, the answer is getting society to pressure cadres into changing.
Reforming the way the Communist Party works will, according to the commentary, “rally public consensus and provide the positive energy of a general mobilization” to support Mr. Xi and this package.
Once the public sees that the Xi leadership has the “courage to break through the obstruction of [outmoded] ideas, and also the courage to breach the defenses of vested interests,” the commentary predicts, “social vitality” will result, and reformers will be vindicated.
But Xi and his allies also know the clock is running: The editorial—coming on the same day as the dates for the Plenum are announced–is also clearly an appeal to cadres who support reform to give one last strong push in the closing days.
The Plenum might not be the last opportunity for the formal approval of political changes thus far. But it does offer the best prospect thus far for Mr. Xi and his allies to make their case that their sort of reform is the one cadres should believe in.
Russell Leigh Moses is the Dean of Academics and Faculty at The Beijing Center for Chinese Studies. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/10/30/editorial-hints-at-xis-challenge/
